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NOTES
Desperate for Revenue: The States'
Unconstitutional Use of the Unitary
Method to Apportion the Taxable




Understanding the process by which each state determines the state
income tax liability of multinational corporations can be a taxing subject
in itself. This Note will analyze this complicated subject in simplified
terms so that the reader can focus on the controlling question of whether
the unitary method of taxation is constitutional.
Part I of this Note reviews briefly the basic methods that individual
states use to determine the state income tax liability of multinational cor-
porations and focuses on the worldwide combined reporting (WWCR)
method or unitary method of taxation. California, Montana, North Da-
kota, and Alaska currently use this method to apportion the state income
tax liability of multinational corporations. This section also provides def-
initions and explains the mechanics of the unitary method. Part II ana-
lyzes whether the unitary method is constitutional under the Foreign
Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution.
The Supreme Court recently ruled that states may use the unitary
method to apportion the taxable income of a United States parent corpo-
ration with foreign subsidiaries.1 The Court explicitly refused, however,
to decide whether the method may be used constitutionally to apportion
the income of foreign parent corporations with domestic subsidiaries.2
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A., University of Arizona, 1988. The author thanks
Professor Leo Martinez for his assistance.
1. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
2. Id. at 189 n.26, 195 n.32.
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This Note considers this unresolved issue and concludes that it is
unconstitutional to use the unitary method of taxation to apportion the
state income tax liability of a foreign parent corporation with domestic
subsidiaries. It argues that the Court should rely on the precedent estab-
lished in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles3 and that the issue is
distinguishable from the issue decided in Container Corp. v. Franchise
Tax Board.4 The Note concludes that under the Japan Line test, the
unitary method as applied to foreign parent corporations is an unconsti-
tutional infringement of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the
Constitution.
I. Definitions
This section reviews the two primary methods of attributing income
tax to a taxing jurisdiction. Forty-five states use a formula to apportion
the corporate income tax attributable to the state.5 The apportionment
formulae differ widely among the states and take into account different
factors in determining what income is attributed to the state.6
A. Methods of Allocating Income
There are two basic methods used to apportion the income of a mul-
tijurisdictional business to a particular state for income tax purposes: (1)
separate accounting, or the arm's-length method; and (2) formulary ap-
portionment.7 Under the arm's-length method, the taxing jurisdiction
treats the separate affiliates of a business as wholly separate entities for
purposes of determining the tax liability of each affiliate." All transac-
tions between the members of the affiliated business must be conducted at
"arm's-length," as though the affiliates were dealing with unrelated par-
3. 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (holding an ad valorem tax imposed on a foreign parent corpora-
tion unconstitutional under the Foreign Commerce Clause).
4. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
5. Review of the Unitary Method of Taxation: Hearings on S. 1113 and S. 1974 Before
the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1986) [hereinafter Review of Unitary Method].
6. Riccarda Heising, Comment, Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board
The Constitutionality of State Power to Tax Multinational Corporations, 16 LAW & PoL'Y
INT'L Bus. 299, 301 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Container Corp.].
7. See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXA-
TION 454-59 (4th ed. 1979). See also Michael P. McAllister, Note, The Controversy Over
Worldwide Unitary Taxation: Legal, Economic, and Political Implications, 9 SuFFOLK TRANS-
NAT'L L.J. 265, 270 (1985) [hereinafter Note, The Controversy].
8. Walter Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multyjurisdictional Corporations: Reflec-
tions on Mobil, Exxon, and H.R. 5076, 79 MICH. L. REv. 113, 117 (1980) [hereinafter Taxa-
tion of Multiurisdictional Corporations]. See also Note, The Controversy, supra note 7, at 270-
71.
THE UNITARY TAXATION METHOD
ties.9 The taxing jurisdiction may tax only the income which is reflected
in the separate accounts of the corporation as arising from the operations
of the demographic affiliate within the jurisdiction.' 0 The federal govern-
ment and members of the international community favor this attribution
method and use it to calculate the income tax liability of multinational
corporations. 1
States, on the other hand, believe this method is unreliable and does
not accurately reflect the amount of income from a multijurisdictional
business that is attributable to a particular state. The primary argument
against the separate accounting method is that "it endeavors to treat sep-
arately what is, in fact, inseparable." 12 The economic reality is that mul-
tinational businesses perform functions in various jurisdictions that are
interdependent. Income is produced when the operations are combined
and integrated. The states argue that it is impossible, therefore, to sepa-
rate and allocate the income-producing functions from the non income-
producing functions, as the separate accounting method seeks to do.13
Moreover, the states argue that when the arm's-length method is
employed, corporations can shelter income in states or countries with
low tax rates using ingenious accounting techniques. 4 As a result, the
states have unanimously rejected the arm's-length method for apportion-
ing multijurisdictional business income.' 5
Because the arm's-length method is inherently difficult to apply, all
states which tax corporate income have adopted a formula apportion-
ment method for determining the income of a multijurisdictional corpo-
9. Hellerstein, Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations, supra note 8, at 117. See
also Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990),
petition for review granted, 806 P.2d 308 (Cal. Feb. 28, 1991) (No. S019064), rev'd, 829 P.2d
279 (Cal. 1992). For recent developments in the Barclays case, see infra notes 215-23 and
accompanying text. See also Note, The Controversy, supra note 7, at 271.
10. Note, The Controversy, supra note 7, at 271.
11. See 26 U.S.C. § 482 (1988); see also U.N. Model Double Taxation Convention Be-
tween Developed Countries and Developing Countries, arts. 7(1), 7(2), 9(2) (1980), U.N. Doc.
No. ST/ESA/102, reprinted in I Tax Treaties (CCH) 1023 (1982); OECD Model Conven-
tion for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, arts.
7(2), 9(1) (1977), reprinted in I Tax Treaties (CCH) % 151 (1980); see also Container Corp. of
Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 184, 187 (1983); see also Note, The Controversy, supra
note 7, at 270.
12. Frank M. Keesling, A Current Look at the Combined Report and Uniformity in Allo-
cation Practices, 42 J. TAX'N 106, 107 (1975).
13. See George H. Weissman, Unitary Taxation: Its History and Recent Supreme Court
Treatment, 48 ALB. L. REV. 48, 51-52 (1983).
14. See Timothy C. Blank, Note, A Proposed Application of the Compact Clause, 66 B.U.
L. REV. 1067, 1070-71 (1986).
15. See Jerome R. Hellerstein, The Unitary Business Principle and Multicorporate Enter-
prises: An Examination of the Major Controversies, 27 TAX EXECUTIVE 313, 315 (1975). See
also Note, The Controversy, supra note 7, at 271.
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ration taxable to the state.1 6 Formulary apportionment, first approved
by the Supreme Court in 1920,17 involves the application of a formula to
a multistate or multinational business to determine the income attributa-
ble to the state. Though used by all states that tax corporate income, the
states employ different versions of formulary apportionment.
The WWCR method, or unitary tax method, is a method of formu-
lary apportionment that applies a formula to a multinational unitary
business' worldwide "income" to determine which portion is attributable
to a given state. California law describes the unitary tax method as
follows:
When the income of a taxpayer subject to the tax imposed under
this part is derived from or attributable to sources both within and
without the state the tax shall be measured by the net income de-
rived from or attributable to sources within this state in accordance
with the provisions of [this article.]"8
One commentator rationalizes the unitary method as follows: "Under
the unitary business principle, when a multijurisdictional unitary busi-
ness is doing business within a state, that state has the required nexus to
both the in-state and out-of-state activities of the business and is, there-
fore, entitled to tax an apportioned share of all its income." 9
Under the unitary method, the state treats affiliated businesses as a
single unitary group and apportions a part of the worldwide income of
the group to the state by applying a three-part formula. The formula
compares the property, payroll, and sales figures for the group in the
state to the property, payroll, and sales figures of the group worldwide to
determine what percentage of the unitary group's property, payroll, and
sales are located in the state."0 This percentage is then applied to the
worldwide income of the unitary group to determine the income taxable
to the state.2" "Simply put, if 25 percent of the property, payroll, and
sales of the unitary group is located in [the state], then 25 percent of the
group's worldwide income is apportioned to [the state]."
22
The unitary method of taxation is not used by any other country in
the world, nor by forty-one of the forty-five states which tax corporate
16. Review of Unitary Method, supra note 5, at 8. See Comment, Container Corp., supra
note 6, at 301.
17. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920) (upholding a Con-
necticut law that based a business' taxable income to the state on the ratio of the value of the
property owned by the business in the state to the value of all other property owned by the
business).
18. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 25101 (West 1992) (emphasis added).
19. Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business: Perspectives on Two Centu-
ries of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 TAx LAw. 37, 75 (1987).




income.23 At one time, thirteen states used the unitary method.24 To-
day, only four states retain the unitary method and all four allow corpo-
rations to choose the "water's-edge" alternative.25
The water's-edge alternative is a method of formulary apportion-
ment that is similar to the unitary method because it also measures in-
come by averaging the payroll, property and sales figures of the
corporation.26 It differs from the unitary method, however, because it
compares the payroll, property and sales figures in the state to the pay-
roll, property and sales figures within the United States.27
B. The Unitary-Business Principle
To withstand constitutional scrutiny, a state may apply an appor-
tionment formula, including the unitary method, only to a unitary busi-
ness. 21 Though the existence of a unitary business is critical to the valid
application of the unitary method, the Court has not adequately defined
what constitutes a unitary business.29 Instead, the Court ordinarily de-
fers to state court definitions of what constitutes a unitary business.3 0 As
long as the state definition is "within the realm of permissible judgment,"
23. 135 CONG. REc. E780 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1989) (statement of Rep. Frenzel).
24. States that no longer use the unitary method, and their post unitary method code
provisions, are Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-303 (1990); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 220.135 (West 1984); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 63-3027 (West 1991); Indiana, IND. CODE
ANN. § 6-3-2-2 (Burns 1990); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. L. ch. 63, § 38 (1986); New Hamp-
shire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 77A:3 (1986); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. §§ 314.280, 314.650
(1986); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-13-78 (1986).
25. Alaska, California, Montana, and North Dakota still use the unitary method, but
allow the corporation to elect either the water's-edge or unitary method of apportionment. See
ALASKA STAT. §§ 43.20.065, 43.20.073 (1990); CAL. RIv. & TAX. CODE §§ 25120-25140
(West 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-31-301, 15-31-305; N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-38-12
(1983 & Supp. 1991). See Carol Douglas, State Tax Officials Debate Interstate Competition
and Water's Edge Unitary, 40 TAx NoTs 347, 349 (1988); Note, Foreign Multinationals and
the Commerce Clause: Should the States Mind Their Own Business?, 41 TAX LAW. 785, 799
(1988). No two states' water's edge provisions are alike. Proponents of federal, rather than
state-by-state, resolution of the unitary issue argue that the states retreat to the water's edge is
not an adequate solution to the problem because the situation is still confusing to multinational
corporations. Review of Unitary Method, supra note 5.
26. See CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 25101, 25110 (West 1992).
27. See id. For a discussion of California's water's-edge election see Ruurd G. Leegstra et
al., The California Water's-Edge Election, 6 J. ST. TAX'N 195 (1987); Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd.
v. Franchise Tax Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), petition for review granted, 806
P.2d 308 (Cal. Feb. 28, 1991) (No. S019064), rev'd, 829 P.2d 279 (Cal. 1992).
28. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 320 n.14 (1982).
29. One commentator noted that because there are no easily ascertainable minimum re-
quirements for a unitary business finding, a "unitary business in the end may simply be some-
thing that the Court knows when it sees." Walter Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of
MultUurisdictional Corporations, Part 1: Reflections on ASARCO and Woolworth, 81 MICH.
L. REy. 157, 183-84 (1982) [hereinafter Reflections on ASARCO].
30. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 175 (1983).
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the Court will not interfere with it.3" In fact, in all but two cases, the
Supreme Court has upheld the states' determinations of what comprises
a unitary business.32 By allowing the states to formulate their own defi-
nitions, the Court essentially reaffirms its position that the states should
be free to tax businesses by any method that reasonably relates income to
the in-state activities of a business.33
The Supreme Court considers a variety of factors in deciding
whether a state designation of a unitary business is appropriate.34 The
Court essentially reviews the "underlying economic realities of a unitary
business" to determine whether the functional departments of a business
are really "discrete business enterprise[s]" or whether they are a unitary
business.35
A central inquiry is whether the profits from a group of affiliated
businesses are the result of "functional integration, centralization of
management, and economies of scale."' 36 Although this analysis involves
many considerations, the Court has established a three-prong test to as-
sist it in determining if a unitary business exists.37 Under the three-uni-
ties test, a group of affiliated businesses is generally unitary if there is (1)
unity of ownership, (2) unity of operation, and (3) unity of use of its
centralized executive force and general system of operation.38 Unity of
31. Container, 463 U.S. at 176 (citing Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S.
534 (1951). See Note, The Controversy, supra note 7, at 272.
32. In ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 320-24 (1982), Idaho
claimed that ASARCO and certain of its subsidiaries in which it held minority or bare major-
ity interests constituted a unitary business. The Supreme Court rejected this contention on the
ground that the partial subsidiaries were not even minimally controlled by ASARCO and were
actually passive investments. Id.
In F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354, 363 (1982), the
Court rejected New Mexico's attempt to broaden the definition'of unitary business to include
all income from operations that related to or contributed to the corporation's business in any
way. Id. Woolworth involved one partially owned subsidiary and three iholly owned subsidi-
aries.
These cases generally are considered deviant cases whose applicability is restricted to their
individual fact situations. See Reflections on ASARCO, supra note 29, at 191-92. The decision
by the Court in Container that California's finding of a unitary business was reasonable is now
the established precedent. See Joel M. Greene, ASARCO and Woolworth: Anomalous Anach-
ronisms with Limited Precedential Value, 18 TAx NOTES 795 (1983).
33. See Heising, supra note 6, at 312-13.
34. See Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 223-25 (1980); see also E.
George Rudolph, State Taxation of Interstate Business: The Unitary Business Concept and
Affiliated Corporate Groups, 25 TAX L. REV. 171 (1970).
35. Exxon Corp., 447 U.S. at 223-24 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes,
445 U.S. 425, 439, 441 (1980)).
36. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980), quoted in
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 179.
37. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 111 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1941), af'd, 315 U.S. 501, 508 (1942).
38. Id at 341. Butler Brothers' subsidiaries were considered a unitary business based on
the finding that they were integrated because of unity of ownership, centralized management,
and the operation of a centralized purchasing division. Id.
ownership usually exists when there is fifty percent or more common
stock ownership, that is, when at least fifty percent of the voting stock of
two or more corporations is owned by one taxpayer.39 Unity of opera-
tion exists if the affiliated businesses use central purchasing, advertising,
accounting, or management divisions.40 Unity of use occurs when the
affiliated businesses share staff, particularly executives, and general oper-
ational systems.41 California adds a fourth unity: strong central man-
agement coupled with the existence of centralized departments for such
functions as financing, advertising, research or purchasing.42
Admittedly, these are not very clear guidelines, but the Court specif-
ically has refused to adopt a "bright line" test.43 In Container Corp. of
America v. Franchise Tax Board, the Court acknowledged that functional
integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale are
key factors in the unitary business analysis. The Court stated, however,
that "[t]he prerequisite to a constitutionally acceptable finding of unitary
business is a flow of value, not a flow of goods."'
In sum, the unitary business analysis is very fact intensive and de-
pends on the circumstances of each particular case. There are no hard
and fast rules, only guidelines. This Note assumes arguendo that the
states correctly apply the unitary method only to unitary businesses. The
question addressed here is whether the unitary method, as an apportion-
ment formula, can be applied constitutionally to foreign unitary
businesses.
II. Constitutional Concerns
The Supreme Court first approved formulary apportionment as a
method for attributing business income in 1920.41 More recently, the
Court considered the validity of using the unitary apportionment method
to apportion the income of United States corporations that have foreign
subsidiaries.46
39. Leegstra, supra note 27, at 252.
40. Butler Bros., 315 U.S. at 508.
41. Leegstra, supra note 27, at 253.
42. Mole-Richardson Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 269 Cal. Rptr. 662, 667 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990).
43. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 178 (1983). Container
Corporation suggested that a "bright line" test should be adopted whereby a "substantial flow
of goods between a parent corporation and its subsidiary would be required for a unitary
business to exist." Id. at 179. Although the Supreme Court refused to impose this "bright
line" test on all of the states, it did not preclude individual states from adopting such a test.
Id. at 178 n.17. In fact, at least one state has adopted such a test. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
ACF Indus., Inc., 271 A.2d 273 (Pa. 1970).
44. Container, 463 U.S. at 178-79.
45. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
46. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983). Container Corpo-
ration is a vertically integrated company which manufactures custom-ordered paperboard
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In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, the Court
held that the unitary method of taxation as applied to domestic parent
companies with foreign subsidiaries is constitutional.47 The Court essen-
tially approved the imposition of an income tax on United States corpo-
rations based on income earned outside of the United States. The Court
decided three issues in reaching this conclusion: (1) Container Corpora-
tion was a unitary business,4" (2) California's unitary tax method fairly
apportioned income to the state,49 and (3) California was not obligated
by the Foreign Commerce Clause to employ the "arm's-length" method
of attributing income.50
The Court has not decided whether it is constitutional for the states
to use the unitary method to apportion the income of a United States
subsidiary of a foreign-based multinational company.51 The Court had
the opportunity to address the issue in two cases, but instead dismissed
them both on the ground that the foreign parent corporation lacked
packaging. Id. at 171. Incorporated in Delaware with headquarters in Chicago, Container
controlled foreign subsidiaries in four Latin American countries and four European countries
at the time of the imposition of the unitary tax method by the California Franchise Tax Board.
Id. at 163, 171. The corporation's ownership interest in these foreign subsidiaries ranged from
66.7% to 100%. IdL at 171.
47. Container, 463 U.S. 159. This was a 5-3 decision, with Chief Justice Burger, Justice
Powell, and Justice O'Connor dissenting. Id. at 197. Justice Stevens took no part in the con-
sideration or decision of the case. Id
48. Container, 463 U.S. at 180.
49. Id. at 180-84. In determining that the three-factor formula used by California was
fairly apportioned, the Court relied on the assumption that any method of taxation would
inevitably lead to some problems. Id. at 183. The Court reasoned that:
Of course, even the three-factor formula is necessarily imperfect. But we have seen
no evidence demonstrating that the margin of error (systematic or not) inherent in
the three-factor formula is greater than the margin of error (systematic or not) inher-
ent in the sort of separate accounting urged upon us by appellant.
Id. at 183-84. Container offered statistics showing that using three-factor WWCR formula to
apportion income resulted in gross distortions in income. Id at 184. The Court reviewed
tables that compared income determinations under the WWCR method and the separate ac-
counting method. Id at 184, 174 n.11, 175 n. 12. The Court concluded that using the WWVCR
method only increased the amount of taxable income to California by 14% and found that this
was "within the substantial margin of error inherent in any method of attributing income
among the components of a unitary business." Id at 184. As a result, the Court excused the
distortion of income which WWCR could potentially cause as not outrageous enough to re-
quire reversal. Id. at 183-84.
50. Id. at 184-97.
51. The Court in Container explicitly left this question open, stating that "[w]e have no
need to address in this opinion the constitutionality of combined apportionment with respect
to state taxation of domestic corporations with foreign parents or foreign corporations with
either foreign parents or foreign subsidiaries." Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
463 U.S. 159, 189 n.26 (1983).
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standing to challenge California's unitary method.52
Recently, in Franchise Tax Board v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 3 the
Supreme Court considered whether a foreign parent corporation had
standing to challenge the unitary tax imposed on its domestic subsidiar-
ies. The Court set forth two necessary components for standing: (1) Ar-
ticle III standing and (2) "non constitutional prudential
considerations."'5 4  The Court granted Article III standing on the
ground that foreign parent corporations are threatened with financial in-
jury when the unitary method is used to calculate the tax liability of their
domestic subsidiaries.5" The Court did not determine whether the non
constitutional prudential requirements for shareholder standing were
met. 6 The Court simply stated that such a decision was unnecessary in
light of the fact that the case was barred by the Tax Injunction Act, even
if Alcan Aluminum Limited (Alcan) did have standing. 7
Removing this procedural obstacle, the Court imposed yet another
procedural hurdle. In Alcan, the Court remanded the case to state court
on the ground that the federal action was barred by the Tax Injunction
Act. 8  In this case, Alcan was a Canadian company and indirect sole
shareholder of Alcan Aluminum Corporation (Alcancorp), incorporated
in Ohio with operations in California. Alcan sought declaratory and in-
junctive relief from California's use of the unitary method on the ground
that it violated the Foreign Commerce Clause.59 Instead of deciding the
issue, the Supreme Court deferred to the California courts. The Court
held that the action in federal court was barred by the Tax Injunction
Act which provides that "[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or
restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law
where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of
52. Shell Petroleum, N.V. v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1012 (1983); EMI Ltd. v. Bennett, 738 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1073
(1984).
Shell contended that the 1956 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between
the Netherlands and the United States prevented California from utilizing the unitary method
to apportion its taxable income. The Ninth Circuit refused to consider the argument, affirming
the district court's dismissal on the ground that, as the majority shareholder, Shell lacked
standing to sue. Shell Petroleum, 709 F.2d at 595-96.
Likewise, EMI was dismissed on the ground that EMI, as a shareholder, did not have
standing to bring the action. EMI, 738 F.2d at 996-98.
53. 493 U.S. 331 (1990).
54. Id at 335.
55. The Court reasoned that if the unitary method illegally assesses taxes and results in a
higher tax liability for the domestic subsidiaries, the foreign parent corporations would be
injured because it would reduce the return on their investments in the subsidiaries and would
lower the value of their stockholdings in the subsidiaries. Id. at 336.
56. Id. at 336-41.
57. Id. at 338.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 334.
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such State."' 60 The Court found that California law allows taxpayers,
who feel that a tax assessed against them is invalid, to bring a claim for a
refund under section 26102 of the California Revenue and Taxation
Code." The Court rejected Alcan's argument that the California courts
would not entertain foreign commerce claims made by its subsidiaries on
the ground that there was no evidence that the courts had done so in the
past.62 In conclusion, the Court held that mere speculation that the Cali-
fornia courts would not entertain the claims of Alcan's subsidiaries was
not sufficient to allow the federal court to retain the action.63
Recently, in Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Board, the
California Court of Appeals considered the foreign parent issue for the
first time.A The court decided that California's use of the unitary
method to apportion the tax of the United States subsidiaries of foreign
parent corporations was unconstitutional. 6  The California Supreme
Court has recently reviewed this case.
66
A. Foreign Commerce Clause
Opponents of the unitary method frequently argue that it violates
the Foreign Commerce Clause.67 The Foreign Commerce Clause autho-
rizes Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations.6 The Com-
merce Clause provides Congress with power "[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes. 69
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, the Supreme Court estab-
lished a four-prong test to determine whether a method of taxation is
constitutional under the Commerce Clause.70 Under this test, a state
may constitutionally apply a method of taxation to a business if (1) the
business' activities have a "substantial nexus" with the state, (2) the tax is
fairly apportioned, (3) the tax does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and (4) the tax is fairly related to the services provided by the
state.71
60. Id. at 338 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982)).
61. Id. at 340.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 341.
64. 275 Cal. Rptr. 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), petition for review granted, 806 P.2d 308 (Cal.
Feb. 28, 1991) (No. S019064), rev'd, 829 P.2d 279 (Cal. 1992). For recent developments in the
Barclays case see infra notes 215-23 and accompanying text.
65. Id.
66. 806 P.2d 308 (Cal. Feb. 28, 1991) (No. S019064).
67. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983); Franchise Tax
Bd. v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 493 U.S. 331 (1990); Barclays Bank, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 628-29.
68. See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 185; Barclays Bank, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 628-29.
69. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
70. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
71. Id. at 279.
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The Court in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles established
two additional requirements to determine whether a tax is constitutional
as applied to instrumentalities of foreign commerce. 72 The tax must not
create a "substantial risk of international multiple taxation, ' 73 and must
not interfere with federal uniformity in foreign relations by preventing
the federal government "from 'speaking with one voice when regulating
commercial relations with foreign governments.' ""7
The unitary method affects foreign commerce when it is used to tax
the domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations. In such a case, the tax
must satisfy both the Complete Auto and Japan Line tests in order to be
constitutionally permissible. As discussed below, the unitary method
does not satisfy these tests and is unconstitutional as applied to the do-
mestic subsidiaries of foreign parent corporations.
L The Complete Auto Test7 5
Under the first prong of the Complete Auto test, the activities of a
business must have a "substantial nexus" with the taxing state in order
for the state to impose a tax on the business.76 In order to satisfy this
requirement, the state must prove that there is a minimal connection be-
tween the activities of the business and the taxing state. There must also
be a rational relationship between the income attributed to the state and
the intrastate values of the enterprise.77
Second, the tax must be fairly apportioned.7" A tax is fairly appor-
tioned if the state's apportionment formula approximates the amount of
business income properly attributable to the corporation's business activ-
ities within the state.79 Under this prong, the Court will not find that a
formula is unfair as applied unless it appears by "clear and cogent evi-
dence" that it yields a "grossly distorted" result. ' Specifically, the plain-
tiff must show that there is "no rational relationship between the income
72. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
73. Id. at 451.
74. Id. at 451.
75. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
76. Id. at 279. See Weissman, supra note 13, at 78. This is also a due process concern and
is discussed infra in part II.B.
77. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978). See also Weissman, supra note 13, at
78.
78. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.
79. Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931).
See also Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 223-25 (1980) (state may apply
an apportionment formula to the total income of a unitary business to determine income at-
tributable to activities conducted within the state).
80. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 164 (1983) (quoting
Exxon Corp., 447 U.S. at 221, quoting Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 507 (1942),
quoting Norfolk & W. Ry. v. North Carolina ex rel Maxwell, 297 U.S. 682, 688 (1936)).
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attributed to the state and the intrastate values of the enterprise.""
Third, the application of the tax may not discriminate against inter-
state or foreign commerce.82 The Court briefly addressed this issue in
Container and suggested that under certain circumstances a tax might be
invalid if it was substantially different from methods used by other juris-
dictions.3 Specifically, a tax could be struck down if it resulted in multi-
ple taxation of income in various jurisdictions." The tax might also be
invalid if it resulted in a higher tax burden than if the business was con-
ducted in a single jurisdiction.85
The Court concluded that a tax method that differs from other state
attribution methods is not invalid solely because it differs from other
methods.86 The Court did not decide, however, whether the unitary
method, which substantially differs from the federal government and in-
ternationally accepted arm's-length method, is invalid.87 The Court re-
served judgement on the question, stating that: "a more searching
inquiry is necessary when we are confronted with the possibility of inter-
national double taxation.
'88
Finally, in order to satisfy the requirements of Complete Auto, the
tax must be fairly related to the services provided by the state.89 The test
is "whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to
the protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state. That simple
but controlling question is whether the state has given anything for
which it can ask return."9
2 The Japan Line91 Test for Instrumentalities of Foreign Commerce
The state must satisfy two additional requirements before a tax can
be applied constitutionally to "instrumentalities of foreign commerce." 92
The tax must not create a "substantial risk of international multiple taxa-
tion," 93 and must not interfere with federal uniformity in foreign rela-
tions by preventing the federal government "from 'speaking with one
voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign
81. Container, 463 U.S. at 180 (quoting Exxon Corp., 447 U.S. at 220).
82. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 278-79; Container, 463 U.S. at 170.
83. Container, 463 U.S. at 170-71.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 171.
87. Id. at 189 n.26.
88. Id. at 171.
89. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
90. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (quoting Wis-
consin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940)).
91. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
92. Id. at 446.
93. Id. at 451.
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governments.' "9
In Japan Line, the Court held that a California property tax was
unconstitutional as applied to cargo containers owned by Japanese ship-
ping companies.95 The containers were used exclusively in foreign com-
merce and were based, registered, and subject to property tax in Japan.
The Court held that the tax violated the Commerce Clause because it
resulted in "multiple taxation of instrumentalities of foreign commerce
... and prevents this Nation from 'speaking with one voice' in regulating
foreign trade and thus is inconsistent with the Congress' power to 'regu-
late commerce with foreign Nations.' "96
The argument that the unitary method, as applied to the domestic
subsidiaries of foreign parent corporations, violates the Foreign Com-
merce Clause primarily focuses on these two Japan Line factors.97 The
emphasis on these factors in recent cases is understandable because the
unitary method, as applied to the domestic subsidiaries of foreign parent
corporations, does not satisfy the Japan Line requirements and is uncon-
stitutional under the Foreign Commerce Clause.9"
a. Substantial Risk of Multiple Taxation
When considering the validity of taxes imposed on domestic corpo-
rations, the Court has construed broadly Japan Line's prohibition of
taxes that create a substantial risk of multiple taxation.9 9 In Container,
Container Corporation unsuccessfully argued that the unitary method
violated the Foreign Commerce Clause because it resulted in double tax-
ation. 1o The Court admitted that imposition of the unitary method "has
resulted in actual double taxation,"10' 1 but found that the unitary method
did not "inevitably" lead to double taxation and, thus, withstood
Container's constitutional challenge." 2  The Court in Container ac-
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 435 (citations omitted).
97. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983); Franchise
Tax Bd. v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 493 U.S. 331 (1990); Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. v. Franchise
Tax Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), petition for review granted, 806 P.2d 308
(Cal. Feb. 28, 1991) (No. S019064), rev'd, 829 P.2d 279 (Cal. 1992). For recent developments
in the Barclays case, see infra notes 215-23 and accompanying text..
In fact, the Court in Japan Line did not decide the constitutionality of the California ad
valorem tax under the four-prong test of Complete Auto and only briefly referred to the test.
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 445, 451. Likewise, in Container, the Court did not even mention the
Complete Auto test. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
98. See Container, 463 U.S. at 185-96; Franchise Tax Bd. v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 493
U.S. 331 (1990).
99. Container, 463 U.S. at 193.
100. Id. at 189-93.
101. Id at 187.
102. Id. at 190-93.
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knowledged the concern expressed in Japan Line regarding double taxa-
tion of foreign entities but reasoned that this did not proscribe absolutely
state taxation resulting in multiple taxation. 10 3 The Court circumvented
the dictate of Japan Line by deciding that it must consider the context in
which the double taxation occurred and the alternatives available to the
state when assessing the validity of the tax."° Thus, rather than review
the unitary method on its own merits, the Court insisted that the alterna-
tive, the arm's-length method, was also likely to result in double taxa-
tion.105 The Court concluded that a strict interpretation of Japan Line's
admonition against double taxation was not plausible because any avail-
able method of taxation presented a substantial risk of multiple taxa-
tion. 0 6 The Court stated that "it would be perverse, simply for the sake
of avoiding double taxation, to require California to give up one alloca-
tion method that sometimes results in double taxation in favor of another
allocation method that also sometimes results in double taxation."10 7
In applying this different standard, the Court in Container distin-
guished the case from Japan Line.'10 First, it found that the tax in Japan
Line was a property tax rather than an income tax." It also found that
the California income tax imposed on Container did not inevitably result
in multiple taxation, unlike the tax in Japan Line." ° Finally, the tax in
Container fell on a domestic-based corporation rather than a foreign-
based corporation."'
Although the Container court was able to overlook and excuse the
double taxation of a domestic corporation, it should not tolerate the mul-
tiple taxation of foreign-based corporations.I 2 The Court in Japan Line
103. Id. at 189.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 191.
106. Id. The validity of this deduction has been questioned. Some argue that even if the
arm's-length method potentially results in multiple taxation, the application of the same
method by the different taxing jurisdictions will more likely avoid overlapping of tax liability
than if the jurisdictions use opposing methods of attributing income. Thus, the best way to
avoid multiple taxation is to prohibit the use of widely varying attribution methods (i.e, the
unitary method). See Philip T. Kaplan, The Unitary Tax Debate, The United States Supreme
Court, and Some Plain English, 10 J. CORP. TAX'N 283, 291 (1984).
107. Container, 463 U.S. at 193.
108. Container, 463 U.S. at 187-96.
109. Id. at 187-88.
110. Id. at 188-93. In Japan Line, both Japan and California claimed the right to tax the
containers in part. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451-52 (1979).
The Court refused to allow California to impose its tax on the containers, reasoning that taxes
must be apportioned among taxing jurisdictions so that no instrument of commerce can be
taxed more than once on its value. Id. at 444. The Court struck down California's use of the
ad valorem tax on the ground that it resulted in multiple taxation because Japan had fully
taxed the containers. Id. at 452.
111. Container, 463 U.S. at 188.
112. See Container, 463 U.S. at 189.
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specifically mandated that a state tax which affects foreign commerce is
subject to greater scrutiny than one that affects only domestic com-
merce. '13 Furthermore, the Court stated that "[e]ven a slight overlap-
ping of tax-a problem that might be deemed de minimis in a domestic
context-assumes importance when sensitive matters of foreign relations
and national sovereignty are concerned."114 Accordingly, in Japan Line
the Court found that the ad valorem tax was unconstitutional because it
resulted in double taxation.11 5
The issue of whether the unitary method survives scrutiny under the
Foreign Commerce Clause when it is applied to the domestic subsidiary
of a foreign parent corporation remains unresolved because the Court has
not decided whether to follow the precedent established in Container or
the precedent established in Japan Line. The Court in Japan Line specif-
ically restricted its decision to situations involving foreign companies in-
volved exclusively in international commerce. 16 It reserved judgement
regarding the "taxability of foreign-owned instrumentalities engaged in
interstate commerce." '117 Likewise, the Court in Container specifically
refrained from deciding whether the unitary method could be used to tax
the domestic subsidiaries of foreign parent corporations."1 The unitary
method is unconstitutional, however, under both the Japan Line test and
the Container test (which modifies Japan Line slightly by providing for a
contextual analysis of the taxing method based on the alternative reason-
able taxing methods available).
First, under Container, the unitary method is unconstitutional when
it is applied to the domestic subsidiaries of foreign parent corporations
because a reasonable alternative taxing method exists. The three available
alternatives to the unitary method are the arm's-length method, the sepa-
rate-allocation method, and the water's-edge method. The arm's-length
method and the separate-allocation method are not, for reasons discussed
earlier, reasonable alternatives available to the states for attributing the
income of multinational corporations.1 9 The "water's-edge" method,
however, is a reasonable alternative.120 If the states used the water's-
edge method, problems of multiple taxation would diminish considerably
because the states determine the tax liability based on the property, pay-
roll and sales that occur within the continental United States. Because
113. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 447-48.
114. Id. at 456.
115. Id at 451-54.
116. Id. at 444.
117. Id at 444 n.7.
118. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 189 n.26, 195 n.32
(1983).
119. See Eric J. CoffilI, Differences in Productivity and Profitability: A Response to Allega-
tions of the Misattribution of Income in the Application of California's Worldwide Unitary
Method, 5 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 246 (1987); supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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no other foreign nation utilizes the unitary method, the income produced
in the United States is not part of the tax base used to calculate tax liabil-
ity in the foreign country. If the taxing authority of the states was lim-
ited to the water's-edge method, then theoretically only the states would
be taking United States property, payroll, and sales factors into account
in the tax base. This would avoid international double taxation since the
foreign country would include only income earned in the country in its
tax base. Because the water's-edge method is a reasonable alternative
taxing method for taxing the income of the domestic subsidiaries of a
foreign parent corporation, the unitary method should be deemed uncon-
stitutional under Container in this context.
Japan Line concerned a foreign parent company involved in foreign
commerce. Therefore, the constitutionality of the unitary method, as ap-
plied to the domestic subsidiary of a foreign parent corporation, is more
appropriately analyzed under the Japan Line test. In Container, the tax
was imposed on a United States-based foreign parent corporation.
Hence, the foreign policy implications were not as severe. The require-
ment of Container that a taxing method must inevitably result in double
taxation before it is held unconstitutional may appropriately be applied
to domestic corporations. When a tax is imposed on a foreign parent
corporation, however, the more lenient test enunciated by the Court in
Japan Line should be used: a tax that substantially increases the risk of
international multiple taxation is unconstitutional.121 Under this test,
the unitary method as applied to the domestic subsidiaries of foreign par-
ent corporations creates a substantial risk of multiple taxation and, thus,
violates the Foreign Commerce Clause.
States apply apportionment formulas, in part, to reduce the risk of
multiple taxation. If all countries utilized the same method of formulary
apportionment, multiple taxation would be avoided. In reality, however,
all other countries use some form of arm's-length method to attribute
and tax corporate income earned within their borders. The unitary
method reaches within those same borders to apportion income, inevita-
bly resulting in multiple taxation.122
Complicating this problem is the fact that when a state imposes an
income tax based on the unitary method it does not adjust liability to
account for the tax burden borne by the corporation in other jurisdic-
tions. 123 Moreover, foreign governments do not, in most instances, take
into account corporate income taxes paid by foreign corporations to indi-
121. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 434. See Winthrop S. Smith Jr., Comment, Constitutional
Law-Commerce Clause-State Apportionment Tax Laws-Container Corp. of America v.
Franchise Tax Board, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 193, 216 (1985).
122. See Kirsten Schlenger, Note, State Worldwide Unitary Taxation: The Foreign Parent
Case, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 445, 462-65 (1985) (arguing that multiple taxation is the
necessary result when foreign parent corporations are involved).
123. See Kaplan, supra note 106, at 292.
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vidual states. 124 If the foreign country exercises full taxing powers over
its domicile corporation and a state apportions tax liability based on the
income earned abroad by the same foreign multinational corporation, the
inequitable result is that both jurisdictions tax the same income without
providing for any deductions for taxes paid in the other jurisdiction.
125
One commentator summarized the problem as follows: "The use of
worldwide unitary taxation necessarily results in international double
taxation; once by the host country and again by the State using the
method." 
126
b. The One-Voice Doctrine
The unitary method presents another constitutional problem. It not
only results in double taxation, it also violates the second requirement of
Japan Line because it prevents the federal government from speaking
with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments.
The states generally are allowed to impose taxes on commerce ab-
sent federal preemptive legislation or special considerations that require
uniformity in foreign affairs. 12 7 The federal government, however, has
the power to act when a state tax interferes with its ability to regulate
foreign commerce. In Japan Line, the Court found that a state tax may
be invalidated in any one of three circumstances: (1) if implementation
of a state apportionment formula causes international disputes,1 28 (2) if a
state tax on foreign-based commerce could lead foreign governments to
retaliate if they believed their domestic corporations were operating at a
competitive disadvantage,1 29 and (3) if other states might adopt a similar
formula, increasing the propensity for multiple taxation of foreign com-
124. Id. at 294 n.33.
125. For a discussion on the tax implications of imposition of WWCR, see Kaplan, supra
note 106, at 286-97.
This double taxation occurred in Japan Line. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,
441 U.S. 434, 451-54 (1979). The Court in Container also conceded this point. Container
Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 187 (1983). But cf Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd.
v. Franchise Tax Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), petition for review granted, 806
P.2d 308 (Cal. Feb. 28, 1991) (No. S019064), rev'd, 829 P.2d 279 (Cal. 1992). The California
Court of Appeals disagreed with this contention in Barclays. The court decided that foreign
and domestic parent corporations are not distinguishable and should be treated the same in
relation to the risk of multiple taxation. Id. In Barclays, the court found that the unitary
method did not inevitably result in double taxation when applied to the domestic subsidiary of
a foreign parent corporation, and held that under Container the tax was constitutionally ap-
plied in that situation. Id. at 638-39.
126. 135 CONG. REc. E780 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1989) (statement Rep. Frenzel).
127. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 196-97.
128. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 450.
129. Id at 450-51.
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merce. 130 In Container, the Court interpreted the one-voice doctrine to
uphold a state tax as long as it does not implicate "foreign policy issues
which must be left to the Federal Government" or violate a "clear fed-
eral directive."' 31
i. Implication of Foreign Policy Issues That Must Be Left to the Federal
Government
One of the chief tests to determine whether a state tax implicates
foreign policy issues that are mandatorily within the province of the fed-
eral government is whether the state tax would offend foreign trading
partners and potentially cause them to retaliate against the United
States.'32 The Court considers three factors in its assessment of the po-
tential for retaliation.' 33 First, the Court looks at whether the tax creates
an "automatic 'asymmetry' in international taxation" that is disadvanta-
geous to the foreign-based multinational business.' 34 Second, the Court
considers whether the tax is applied to a domestic corporation or a for-
eign corporation. 3 ' Finally, the Court considers whether the tax burden
is attributable more to the tax rate in the state or to application of the
unitary method.
136
The Court in Container applied these factors and held that the uni-
tary tax method, as applied to a domestic parent corporation with foreign
subsidiaries, did not implicate foreign policy issues that are within the
province of the federal government. 137 The Court commenced its discus-
sion of the issue by expressing its opinion that:
[t]his Court has little competence in determining precisely when
foreign nations will be offended by particular acts, and even less
competence in deciding how to balance a particular risk of retalia-
tion against the sovereign right of the United States as a whole to
let the States tax as they please.
138
First, the Court held that the unitary method does not create an auto-
matic asymmetry in international taxation because it does not inevitably
result in multiple taxation. 139 Second, the court found that the legal inci-
130. Id. See Kevin M. Kohls, Note, State Unitary Taxes Imposed on Foreign-Based Mul-
tinational Groups: A Post Container Analysis, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 219, 233-34 (1984).
131. Container, 463 U.S. at 194.
132. Container, 463 U.S. at 194 (citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S.
434, 450 (1979)).
133. Container, 463 U.S. at 194-95.
134. Container, 463 U.S. at 195.
135. Id. The Court in Container addressed the issue in relation to a U.S. parent corpora-
tion but refrained from an analysis with respect to a foreign parent corporation. Id. at 195
n.32.
136. Container, 463 U.S. at 195.
137. Id. at 194-95.
138. Id. at 194.
139. Id. at 188, 192-93.
dence of the tax fell on a domestic corporation, rather than on a foreign
corporation as was the case in Japan Line."4 Notably, the Court directly
commented that this factor might be analyzed differently if the tax fell on
a domestic subsidiary of a foreign parent corporation."' Finally, the
Court reasoned that the California tax burden of a domestic corporation
with foreign subsidiaries is primarily attributable to California's tax rate,
not its allocation method. 42 The Court based this final conclusion on an
unsupported assumption that:
Although a foreign nation might be more offended by what it con-
siders unorthodox treatment of appellant than it would be if Cali-
fornia simply raised its general tax rate to achieve the same
economic result, we can only assume that the offense involved in
either event would be attenuated at best.143
Although the Court upheld the unitary method in Container,1" it
suggested that if the parent corporation in Container had been a foreign
corporation, the Court might have conducted a stricter Foreign Com-
merce Clause analysis.1 4  In dissent, Justice Powell, joined by Justice
O'Connor and Chief Justice Burger, expressed the view that "[i]t seems
inevitable that the tax would have to be found unconstitutional at least to
the extent it is applied to foreign companies." 14
In Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Board., the California
Court of Appeals evaluated the Container factors in a case involving a
foreign parent corporation, and agreed with Justice Powell's conclusion
that the tax in this situation is unconstitutional. 47 The court in Barclays
determined that the unitary method creates an automatic asymmetry in
international taxation because it puts the foreign parent corporation at a
competitive disadvantage. 148 The court stated that domestic parent cor-
porations with foreign subsidiaries are at an advantage because they are
not subject to this taxation method in other countries since no other
140. IM at 195.
141. Id. at 195 n.32.
142. I d at 195.
143. Id In light of the recent uproar in the international community over the unitary
method, primarily based on the difficulty of complying with the filing and accounting require-
ments and concerns regarding multiple taxation, this argument is without basis. It is incon-
ceivable that simply raising the tax rate would create the same level of furor and retaliation
among the international community as the unitary method. Increasing the tax rate, while
perhaps generating the same amount of revenue for California, would not result in double
taxation and would not force the foreign corporations to comply with the burdensome report-
ing and accounting requirements imposed by the unitary method.
144. Id. at 194-95.
145. Id. at 195 n.32. See also Schlenger, supra note 121, at 449.
146. Container, 463 U.S. at 203 (Powell, J., dissenting).
147. 275 Cal. Rptr. 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990),petition for review granted, 806 P.2d 308 (Cal.
Feb. 28, 1991) (No. S019064), rev'd, 829 P.2d 279 (Cal. 1992). For recent developments in the
Barclays case, see infra notes 215-23 and accompanying text.
148. Id. at 638.
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country in the world uses the unitary method.14 9 Further, the adminis-
trative burdens and costs of compliance are much higher, at times even
prohibitive, for a foreign corporation than for a domestic corporation."'
The court listed several difficulties that foreign-based corporations face in
complying with the unitary method that domestic corporations do not
face. For instance, their records may be in many different languages,
their bookkeeping methods may not be in accord with United States gen-
eral accounting principles, and they may not record their books in
United States currency.' In Barclays, witnesses testified that it would
cost Barclays between $6.4 million and $7.7 million to establish a system
for complying with California's unitary method and another $2 million
to $3.8 million each year to maintain the system even though all the
records were in English.' 2 In light of this overwhelming burden, the
court found that the unitary tax method created an "automatic asymme-
try" disadvantageous to the foreign corporation.
5 3
The court easily dispensed with the second prong of the Container
retaliation test by finding that the incidence of the tax in Barclays fell
directly on a domestic corporation with a foreign parent and directly on
a foreign corporation with a foreign parent and foreign subsidiaries.'
The court rejected arguments that the tax burden fell only on the United
States subsidiary of the corporation. 15 It held, instead, that it is impossi-
ble to isolate the income of a United States subsidiary from the income of
a foreign parent corporation and, therefore, it is impossible to isolate the
tax liability of unitary business by jurisdiction.' 5 6 The Court concluded
that the incidence of the unitary method of taxation "falls on the entire
business, including the foreign parent."' 5 7
Finally, the court in Barclays concluded that the tax burden is more
a function of the unitary method than of California's tax rate.' 58 The
Court compared the difficulties the foreign parent corporation would face
under the separate accounting, or arm's-length method, to those it faced
under the unitary method.' 9 Citing the administrative burdens of com-
pliance associated with the unitary method, and the fact that even the
149. Id. at 638-39.
150. Id. at 639. Language barriers, in part, account for this added burden. Ido Alcan also
complained to the Court about the immense burden of complying with California's informa-
tion demands in assessing tax liability under the unitary method. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Alcan
Aluminum Ltd., 493 U.S. 331, 337 (1990).
151. Barclays, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
152. Id. at 640.
153. Id. at 638.




158. Id. at 639.
159. Id. at 640.
Franchise Tax Board found that only 1.5% of the worldwide income
generated by the Barclays group in 1977 was attributable to California,
the court reasoned that the tax burden was more a function of the uni-
tary method than California's tax rate."6
Foreign retaliation is no longer a matter of speculation, it is a real-
ity. Many countries vehemently oppose the use of the WWCR method
and some have even retaliated against the United States and its domestic-
based corporations. Moreover, foreign corporations that are subject to a
taxing method they perceive to be unfair, may choose to do business in
states or other countries that do not use the unitary method.
1 61
Kazuo Inamori, Chairman of Kyocero (an international corpora-
tion), expressed the frustration of foreign corporations:
[T]he unitary tax was put in effect retroactively and we found our-
selves paying close to 100% of our profits in taxes. This stiff taxa-
tion meant that no matter how hard we worked, we would never be
able to use any of our profits....
The amount of money we have had to pay or accrue amounts
to more than thirty and some million dollars from California's uni-
tary tax alone. What should have been used for revitalization and
capital investment had to go to pay the double taxation.
162
Some Japanese companies have threatened not to do business in
states utilizing the WWCR method.1 63 Such threats caused Florida, In-
diana, and Oregon to repeal their unitary taxes. 64
The most prevalent opposition and retaliation has come from Brit-
ain. The United Kingdom retaliated by unanimously passing a bill that
denies favorable tax treatment to United States corporations headquar-
tered in states that use the unitary method of taxation.1 6  The United
States response to this legislation was summed up by Senator Mathias:
160. Iat
161. The Seventh Circuit articulated the dilemma: "The unitary tax diminishes the attrac-
tiveness of owning American subsidiaries in comparison with entering into contracts with in-
dependent companies as a means of engaging in foreign commerce." Franchise Tax Bd. v.
Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 860 F.2d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 1988), quoted in Franchise Tax Bd. v.
Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 493 U.S. 331, 337 (1990). The Court concluded "[i]t is the incidence of
the unitary tax, its potential to disfavor a particular mode of foreign participation in the Amer-
ican economy, rather than the magnitude of the costs, that provides the strongest argument for
standing." Id.
162. 133 CONG. REc. E3973, E3974-75 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1987) (statement of Rep.
Shumway).
163. Executives of Sony of America, a subsidiary of the Japanese company, threatened
California and Florida from 1984 to 1986 that they would cancel plans to build facilities in
these states unless their unitary taxes were repealed. 134 CONG. Rac. El, E2 (daily ed. Jan.
25, 1988) (statement of Rep. Florio).
164. See WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 1984, at A15.
165. Favorable treatment is provided to all other corporations under a bilateral tax treaty
between the United States and the United Kingdom. 134 CONG. REC. El, E2 (daily ed. Jan.
25, 1988) (statement of Rep. Florio).
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"This legislation will be injurious to American corporations, and ... I
think it will cost America jobs." '166
ii. Clear Federal Directive
Container also held that a state tax is unconstitutional if it violates a
clear federal directive. 16 7 The Court in Container sustained the unitary
method in spite of this prohibition, noting that Congress had not enacted
legislation that prohibited the states from using the unitary method.168
The Court emphasized that although the United States is a party to a
number of tax treaties that require the federal government to use the
arm's-length method in taxing multinational corporations, these treaties
generally do not require the states to use the arm's-length method when
taxing domestic corporations. 169 The Court points out that Congress has
not prohibited the states from using the unitary method, noting that
United States tax treaties do not apply to state taxing activities and that
"in none of the treaties does the restriction on 'non arm's-length' meth-
ods of taxation apply to the States." 170 In support of this, the Court cited
the fact that the Senate specifically rejected a treaty provision that would
have prohibited the states from using the unitary method in some cir-
cumstances.1 71 Based on these findings, the Court held that U.S. foreign
policy concerns were not implicated directly and that California's unitary
method, as applied to foreign subsidiaries of domestic corporations, did
not violate a clear federal directive and was not "fatally inconsistent with
federal policy. ' 172 Rather, in this context, the corporate taxation is a
matter of local, not international, concern.
171
The Court in Japan Line, however, interpreted the requirement and
found that California's use of the ad valorem tax violated a federal pol-
icy.174 The federal policy at issue in Japan Line was expressed in the
Customs Convention on Containers to which the United States was a
party.1 75 The Convention provided for the uniform treatment of contain-
ers used exclusively in foreign commerce and allowed containers tempo-
rarily imported to be admitted free of any importation taxes. 176 The
Court held that California's tax would make it difficult to achieve this
166. 131 CONG. REC. 19,000 (July 15, 1985) (statement of Sen. Mathias).
167. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 196-97 (1983).
168. Id. at 196-97.
169. Id. at 196.
170. Id.
171. Id. (citing 124 CONG. REc. 18,400, 19,706 (1978)).
172. Id. at 197.
173. Id. at 196.
174. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 452-54 (1979).
175. Id. at 436 n.1, 452-53 (citing Customs Conventions on Containers, opened for signa-
ture May 18, 1956, art. l(b), 20 U.S.T. 301, 304 (entered into force with respect to the United
States on Mar. 3, 1969)).
176. Id. at 453 (citing 20 U.S.T. at 304).
federal policy of uniform treatment. In addition, if other states followed
California's example, the foreign-owned containers would be subject to
varying degrees of multiple taxation depending on which port they en-
tered. This would make it virtually impossible for the federal govern-
ment to speak with one voice.' 77
As in Japan Line, the imposition of the unitary method on foreign
parent corporations with domestic subsidiaries interferes with a federal
directive. First, Congressional inaction should not be interpreted as sat-
isfaction with the unitary method.17 Rather, the principle of federalism
governs and Congress' inaction should be attributed primarily to its hesi-
tancy to interfere with the states' power to tax. 17 9 Many pieces of legisla-
tion have been introduced on this issue.180 The primary debate does not
concern whether the unitary method is fair, but whether Congress should
preempt the states in their ability to collect revenue.'
Second, contrary to assertions made by the Court in Container, the
executive branch has expressed deep concern regarding the unitary
method; three administrations have denounced its use.'8 2 The Carter
Administration agreed to resolve the issue in light of protests from major
trade partners and complaints from the multinational enterprises. After
the United States Senate refused to prohibit the states from using the
unitary method, the Carter Administration included a provision in a
United States-United Kingdom income tax treaty prohibiting the states
from using the unitary method in certain circumstances. 8 3  President
Reagan also responded to international pressure by establishing a World-
wide Unitary Taxation Working Group to examine the unitary method
177. Id. at 453.
178. See 131 CONG. Rc. E5754 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (statement of Rep. Duncan); 135
CONG. RFc. E780 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1989) (statement of Rep. Frenzel).
179. See 135 CONG. Rc. E780, E781 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1989) (statement of Rep.
Frenzel); 132 CONG. REc. S7837 (daily ed. June 18, 1986) (statement of Sen. Mathias).
180. See, eg., 135 CONG. REc. E780 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1989); 132 CONG. REC. S7488
(daily ed. June 13, 1986); 131 CONG. Rnc. E5759 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985).
181. See supra note 179.
182. The Ford Administration drafted a bilateral tax convention with the United Kingdom
that would have prohibited the states' use of the unitary tax method. Convention Between the
United States and the United Kingdom for Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 31, 1975,
U.S.-U.K., 31 U.S.T. 5670, 5677.
Likewise, President Carter included a similar provision in an income tax treaty between
the United States and the United Kingdom. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
President Reagan formed a working group to research the problem and eventually recom-
mended that Congress pass legislation to prohibit the states from using the unitary tax method.
See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
183. See Peter Winship, State Taxation of Multinational Business: The Unitary Tax De-
bate, 1985 J. Bus. L. 179, 179-80. The Senate debates surrounding this issue provide insight
regarding the U.S. concerns. See 124 CONG. REc. 18,400-30, 18,651-70, 19,076-78 (1978).
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and make recommendations regarding its use.18 4 This group recom-
mended that the unitary method be abolished and that the water's-edge
alternative be used instead for all foreign and domestic based compa-
nies.185 Further, the Solicitor General filed an amicus curiae brief stating
that the unitary method "impairs federal uniformity in an area where
such uniformity is essential." ' 6
The unitary method also frustrates the federal government's ability
to negotiate and deal with foreign nations. The United States is a party
to at least thirty-six tax treaties.187 One of the major goals of these tax
treaties is to eliminate multiple taxation.1 88 In order to further this goal,
the treaties require the federal government to tax foreign corporations
with the arm's-length method.189 Most of these tax treaties also prohibit
discrimination against citizens of foreign countries through the imposi-
tion of taxes more burdensome than those imposed upon its own citi-
zens.190  One treaty, the United States-France Convention of
Establishment, specifically prohibits attribution methods which account
for income earned outside the taxing jurisdiction. 191
Though the treaties do not bind the states, the federal government
may assert treaty provisions to preempt state tax laws.1 92 The general
purpose of the treaties is to avoid multiple taxation. 19 3 Because the uni-
tary method leads to multiple taxation, it interferes with this goal. The
states should not be allowed to interfere with the federal directive by
using the unitary method.
In conclusion, both Congress and the executive branch have clearly
expressed their dissatisfaction with the unitary method. In the interest of
184. Chairman's Report on the Worldwide Unitary Taxation Working Group: Activities,
Issues, and Recommendations, 24 TAX NOTEs 581 (1984); see Martin Miller & William M.
Dunlap, Jr., Unitary Tax Working Group-An Impossible Dream, 3 J. ST. TAx'N 85 (1984).
185. See Chairman's Report, supra note 184, at 581-99; see also 24 T.Ax NoTES 1044-67
(1984).
186. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Chicago Bridge & Iron
Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 463 U.S. 1220 (1983) (No. 81-349).
187. I.R.S. PUB. No. 54, TAX GUIDE FOR U.S. CITIZENS AND RESIDENT ALIENS
ABROAD 30 (1990-91).
188. Carl Estes, Tax Treaties, 14 INT'L LAW. 508, 508-09 (1980).
189. Notes, A Post Container Analysis, supra note 130, at 244.
190. I.R.S. PUB. No. 54, TAX GUIDE FOR U.S. CITIZENS AND RESIDENT ALIENS
ABROAD 23-24 (1990-91). It is questionable whether the WWCR method would be struck
down directly under such provisions since the method is imposed on domestically based corpo-
rations as well as foreign based corporations, though the argument could be made that the
WWCR method discriminates against foreign corporations because of the enhanced compli-
ance costs for foreign corporations. For a discussion of these arguments see A Post Container
Analysis, supra note 130, at 243 n.192.
191. Convention of Establishment, Nov. 25, 1959, U.S.-Fr., art. IX, 11 U.S.T. 2398, 2409
(entered into force Dec. 21, 1960). See A Post Container Analysis, supra note 130, at 243.
192. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
193. Estes, supra note 188, at 508-09.
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federalism, however, neither has specifically prohibited the states from
using it. The Court should nonetheless follow the precedent set forth in
Japan Line and find the unitary method unconstitutional because there is
a clear federal directive disfavoring it. Judicial action is the only way to
assure that the federal government is able to speak with one voice in this
sensitive area regarding foreign affairs.
B. Due Process Concerns
Although the California Court of Appeals recently deemed a review
of the constitutionality of the WWCR method under the Due Process
Clause unnecessary, instead holding that the method was unconstitu-
tional under the Foreign Commerce Clause," 4 the issue will be consid-
ered here.
The Due Process Clause of the Constitution prohibits a state from
taxing income earned outside of the state. 9 Due process requires a
"minimal connection" or "nexus" between the taxing state and the inter-
state activities of a multinational corporation and "a rational relationship
between the income attributed to the state and the intrastate values of the
enterprise." '196 In terms of a domestic-based corporation, these tests are
satisfied as long as the business affiliates are a unitary business and some
part of its business is conducted in the state."7
L The Fairness Requirement
The Due Process Clause also requires that the applicable apportion-
ment formula be fair. 98 A formula is fair if it is both internally and
externally consistent.199 An internally consistent apportionment formula
is one that, if used by every jurisdiction, would result in the total income
of the aggregate unitary business being taxed only once.2 °° An appor-
tionment formula is externally consistent if the factors in the apportion-
ment formula "actually reflect a reasonable sense of how income is
194. Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 626 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990), petition for review granted, 806 P.2d 308 (Cal. Feb. 28, 1991) (No. S019064), rev'd, 829
P.2d 279 (Cal. 1992). For recent developments in the Barclays case, see infra notes 215-23 and
accompanying text.
195. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. See also Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447
U.S. 207 (1980) (holding that state's taxation of Exxon as a unitary business violated both the
Due Process Clause and the Foreign Commerce Clause).
196. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 165-66 (1983) (quoting Exxon Corp., 447 U.S. at 219-20,
quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37 (1980)).
The Supreme Court has repudiated a state tax on the basis of lack of rational relationship
only in one instance. Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
197. Container, 463 U.S. at 165-66.
198. Id. at 169. See also Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980);
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 272-73 (1978).
199. Container, 463 U.S. at 169.
200. Id
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generated."2 1 To prove external inconsistency the taxpayer must prove
by" 'clear and cogent evidence' that the income attributed to the State is
in fact 'out of all appropriate proportions to the business transacted...
in that State.' "202
The Court in Container upheld the WWCR method as constitu-
tional under the Due Process Clause when applied to domestic parent
corporations.20 3 In support of this determination, the Court found that
Container had not shown that the income apportioned to California was
completely disproportionate to the amount of business transacted by the
corporation in the state.2"
Container argued that its foreign subsidiaries were more profitable
than its domestic operations and that because the unitary method ignores
this differentiation, the income allocation was distorted.2 °5 The Court
rejected this argument on the ground that the data submitted by
Container to prove this distortion was gathered in accordance with sepa-
rate accounting principles which the Court deemed theoretically
unsound.206
Container further argued that lower production costs in foreign
countries resulted in the inflation of income attributable to the United
States.207 The Court dismissed this argument as well. The Court con-
cluded that Container could not rely on one factor to prove distortion of
income and that factors other than the cost of production would need to
be taken into consideration.
20 8
The Court decided that the three-factor unitary method fairly re-
flected the generation of income within the state.2°9 The Court's ap-
proval of this formula, however, should not be accepted as a blanket rule
applicable in all situations. Rather, the Court should re-evaluate the fair-
ness of the formula on a case-by-case basis in the context in which it is
applied.
Although Container excused the distortions of income in cases in-
volving domestic parent corporations, the Court should scrutinize the
distortions more closely when foreign parent corporations are involved.
Application of the unitary method to, foreign parent multinational corpo-
201. Id.
202. Id. at 170 (quoting Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel Maxwell, 283 U.S.
123, 135 (1931)).
203. Container, 463 U.S. at 180-84.
204. Id. at 180-85.
205. Id. at 181.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 181-82. Container supported this with data illustrating the lower wage rates in
foreign countries, without commensurate lower productivity. Id. at 182. In one instance, it
demonstrated that the labor costs in a foreign plant were 40% of similar costs in the California
plants. Id.
208. Id. at 182.
209. Id. at 183.
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rations creates enormous potential for income earned outside a state to
be taxed. Under the unitary method, profits of a multinational are aggre-
gated from the worldwide operations of the company. 2 0 The propor-
tionate value of the property, payroll, and sales is then applied to
determine the amount of income subject to state tax.211 This method,
however, does not even attempt rationally to determine what portion of
the income of a foreign-based company was actually generated in a state.
Rather, the unitary method disproportionately assigns income to a state,
especially "if inputs such as property and payroll are cheaper abroad, or
if management systematically requires higher profit ratios from offshore
operations to compensate for greater risks." '212 For example, the Califor-
nia-based domestic subsidiary of a foreign-based multinational company
could be unprofitable and still pay income tax in California under the
unitary method if the worldwide operations of the corporation were prof-
itable.2"' The result is that California taxes income earned outside its
borders in violation of the Due Process Clause.
Foreign-based companies, in the interest of economy and efficiency,
often perform many functions outside the United States and relatively
few within the United States. Companies seek to manufacture products
and locate factories in countries where the costs of labor, production,
property, and materials are the lowest.2" 4 While a United States-based
corporation may perform some income producing activities through for-
eign subsidiaries, the probability that income actually will be earned
outside the borders of the state or the United States is greater with a
foreign-based corporation. Thus, distortion in income due to distortion
of the property, sales, and payroll factors is more likely. This is best
illustrated by a hypothetical. Company X is a Mexican multinational
corporation that produces and distributes widgets. Company X owns a
subsidiary Company Y that is located in California. The two affiliated
businesses are considered a unitary business. Company Y produces 100
widgets in California. Each widget takes one hour to produce. In Cali-
fornia, labor costs $4.00 per hour. In Mexico, the cost of labor is $1.00
per hour. In California, the cost of materials to produce a widget is $2.00
210. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text; see also Review of Unitary Method of
Taxation: Hearing on S. 1113 and S. 1974 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Man-
agement of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1986). This conflicts with
the federal approach of determining taxable income individually by item. Id
211. Id. at 8-9.
212. Id.
213. See Blank, supra note 14, at 1072 n.25.
214. Likewise, it would be logical to assert that companies will seek to conduct production
and income producing activities in jurisdictions in which the tax liability will be lower. Be-
cause the arm's length method is the internationally accepted method of taxation, the primary
concern of the corporation would be locating income-producing activities in jurisdictions with
lower tax rates. This strategy is, however, defeated by conducting any activity remotely con-
tributing to income in a state utilizing the unitary method.
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and in Mexico it is $1.00. Company X owns a plant in Mexico valued at
$500,000. Company Y owns an identical plant in California valued at $2
million. Eighty percent of the widgets are sold in the United States, 10%
in California for $20 per widget. The remaining 20% are sold in Mexico
for $5 per widget. Applying the WWCR method, 10% of sales occur in
California, 80% of the property is in California ($2M/$2.5M), and 80%
of payroll ($400/$500) is in California. The average is 56.6%. Total
worldwide profit for the company is $2360, $120 from the 40 widgets
sold in Mexico and $2240 from the widgets sold in the United States.
California, applying the unitary method, will tax 56.6% of the total prof-
its ($2360), even though only half of the widgets were actually produced
in California and only 10% were actually sold there. Moreover, Mexico
will apply some form of arm's-length method to tax income attributable
to that country. Thus, the 100 widgets produced in Mexico will be taxed
there also.
The same amount of widgets were produced in Mexico, but at a
higher profit margin. Although the same amount of widgets were pro-
duced in Mexico as in California, the widgets produced in Mexico ac-
count for a greater portion of the company's total income. Under the
unitary method, though, California will benefit from the aggregation of
the profits.
Conclusion
Because of the substantial sum of revenue at stake and the interna-
tional uproar, the Court should determine whether the unitary method is
constitutional as applied to a foreign parent corporation. The Court in-
evitably will be assigned this arduous task because both Congress and the
executive branch continue to avoid the issue. Following the tests set
forth in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady; Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of
Los Angeles; Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board; and
Barclays Bank International, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Board, the Court
should hold that the unitary method violates the Foreign Commerce and
Due Process Clauses of the Constitution when it is applied to a foreign
parent corporation.
Recent Developments
Shortly before this Note was published, the California Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the appellate court in Barclays Bank Inter-
national, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Board.215 The California Supreme Court
upheld the state's use of the unitary tax method on the ground that the
215. Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 626 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990), petition for review granted, 806 P.2d 308 (Cal. Feb. 28, 1991) (No. S019064), rev'd, 829
P.2d 279 (Cal. 1992).
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court of appeals improperly applied the dormant Commerce Clause to
invalidate the unitary tax method.216
Specifically, the court held that the court of appeals erred by not
following the precedent set forth in Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida De-
partment of Revenue.217 The Court in Wardair refused to apply the dor-
mant Commerce Clause to invalidate California's unitary method
because it found that the federal government was "silent" regarding the
viability of the state unitary taxation method, and that this silence pre-
cluded a dormant Commerce Clause analysis.218
Applying Wardair, the court held that the dormant Commerce
Clause was not applicable in this case since the federal government was
silent regarding the application of the unitary method to foreign parent
corporations with domestic subsidiaries. 219 The court based its finding of
governmental "silence" on the fact that Congress clearly was aware of
problems with the unitary tax method, yet repeatedly had failed to pass
legislation to remedy the problem. 220 The court also found that the Sen-
ate's express rejection of an income tax convention with the United
Kingdom, which would have prevented states from using the unitary
method, indicated that there was no "clear federal directive" which pro-
hibited the states from using the method.221 The court stated that the
Senate's action "demonstrates that while federal executive branch offi-
cials aspired to eliminate a state tax practice.., the law as it presently
stands acquiesces."222 The court concluded its discussion by stating that
where Congress "evidences both an awareness of an issue and a refusal to
adopt the remedy urged upon it," their inaction "is a governmental si-
lence that is eloquent.
'223
216. Id at 292-99.
217. 477 U.S. 1; Barclays, 829 P.2d at 292-95.
218. Barclays, 829 P.2d at 291.
219. IM. at 300.
220. Id at 294-95.
221. Id at 295-96.
222. Id at 295 (quoting Wardair, 477 U.S. at 11).
223. Id at 300.
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